SUEZ CRISIS (1956 – 1957) The British and French challenging of Egyptian President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, also involving Israel, and ending in. Obike launched in February 2017 with the idea to connect thousands of rentable bikes to a smartphone app that allows you to locate a GPS-equipped bike, scan a QR code. In the war’s first days, Egyptian forces advanced beyond the Bar-Lev Line and as far as nine miles into the Sinai. The Israelis under Generals Avraham Adan, Ariel.
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The Arab- Israeli War of 1. Honor, Oil, and Blood. By O'Brien Browne. Lizards lay about on sun- warmed stones, blinking in contentment. Falcons circled lazily in the pale blue sky. The waters of the Suez Canal lapped gently at its sandy shores. Suddenly, at exactly 2 p.
Egyptian artillery pieces, Katyusha rockets, howitzers, and surface- to- surface missiles blasted the canal’s eastern bank, throwing tremendous plumes of sand into the air. Israeli defensive positions years in the making were pulverized in minutes. Without warning, 2. Egyptian Mi. G and Sukhoi fighters came screaming out of the sky and bombed command posts, surface- to- air batteries, air bases, supply dumps, and radar installations.
Simultaneously, a few hundred miles to the north, the rugged hills of the Golan Heights shook with massive explosions as 1. Syrian Mi. Gs attacked Israeli positions and an assault force of as many as 9. Israeli territory. The October War had begun.
Before it was over, battalions of tanks, hundreds of aircraft, and legions of soldiers would clash in one of the late 2. Oil prices would soar to unprecedented heights, and the specter of nuclear war would loom over the battlefield. Though brief—fighting ended within a month—the conflict had enormous impact. It broke a political stalemate and made possible a long Egyptian- Israeli peace that’s unique in the roiling Middle East. The so- called War of Attrition followed, with artillery duels, commando raids, air strikes, and diplomatic forays, none of which shook Israel’s grip on its newly occupied territories. Stymied, Egyptian president Anwar el- Sadat determined to retake the lost lands with another war. Sadat went to Syrian president Hafez el- Assad, who burned to recapture the Golan Heights.
Jordan and Iraq agreed to provide a few military units. Sadat, a talented politician and soldier who had succeeded longtime president Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1. Israel would negotiate on the occupied lands only if threatened militarily, he thought. And he knew that if he made peace without a fight, Saudi Arabia and other rich Arab states would cut off much- needed development aid to Egypt. SADAT DID NOT SET OUT TO DESTROY Israel. The IDF was too strong, and the United States would never let its ally fall. Rather, he wanted to deliver a blow that would shake the IDF’s sense of invincibility—inflated by its quick victory in the 1.
Israel and its allies that the negotiating table offered the best chance for security. Once hostilities opened, the United States and the Soviet Union would almost certainly get involved—the Americans to protect Israel, and the Russians to help Syria and maintain its influence in the region. Sadat also assumed the United Nations would insist on a cease- fire. The key, he believed, was to quickly retake as much land as possible to give Egypt a strong bargaining position in negotiations that would undoubtedly follow. As the Egyptians stormed across the Suez Canal and occupied part of the Sinai, Syrian forces would move to retake the Golan Heights. Military leaders for the two countries tapped the Soviet Union for help constructing the world’s most formidable surface- to- air defense systems, with SAM- 2, - 3, - 6, and - 7 missile batteries.
They bought thousands of rocket- propelled grenade launchers and AT- 3 Saggers, wire- guided antitank missiles. Soviet T- 5. 5s and T- 6. Mi. G- 1. 7, - 2.
Su- 7 and - 2. 0 fighter- bombers, as well as Scud surface- to- surface missiles. Egyptian soldiers trained intensely, rehearsing their attack across the Suez at least 3. Israeli installations. Sadat’s chief of staff, Lieutenant General Saad el- Shazly, focused on what he called “the harshest test”: crossing the Suez Canal, which was as wide as 2. IDF engineers had built on the other side. These mountains of sand topped 6. To carve out passages for their men and machines, the Egyptians created some 4.
The Arabs would face an Israeli military feared for its armor and air power. On the ground, IDF forces were headed by well- armored Centurion and M- 6. Super Shermans,” revved- up versions of the World War II classic with 7. In the air, the Israeli Air Force, which totaled 3. F- 4 Phantoms, A- 4 Skyhawks, Mirages, and Super- Myst. The Bar- Lev Line, a chain of fortifications, stretched 1. Suez, from the Mediterranean in the north to the Gulf of Suez in the south.
In the Golan Heights, an intricate network of antitank trenches, firing platforms, and listening posts defended Israeli lands. The IDF felt secure behind these barriers—perhaps too secure. Before the Egyptian attack, less than half of the Bar- Lev defenses were manned fully. Strutting with confidence after the Arab collapse in the 1. Israel’s military leaders underestimated their foes. They decided to open the attack on October 6, when the Suez Canal’s currents and tides would be optimal for a crossing.
This would also be Yom Kippur, the holiest day for Jews. Arabs call it the Ramadan War because the fighting opened during the holy month of Ramadan and on the very day when Muslims feast to celebrate the Prophet Muhammad’s victory at the Battle of Badr and his return to Mecca.
Indeed, the Egyptians code- named their attack Operation Badr. Israel remained largely unaware of the Arab plan, thanks to a brilliant campaign of deception. Because the Syrians did little to conceal their military buildup, the IDF was convinced that it was of no consequence. Egypt’s movements seemed little different than its annual autumn military exercises.
To add to the misdirection, Egyptian and Syrian leaders whispered to the press about deep rifts dividing their two countries as Sadat made blustery speeches about a “year of decision” that never seemed to come. As the Arab buildup began to look like a real threat, some Israeli officials urged a preemptive strike. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Prime Minister Golda Meir balked, worried that Israel would be seen as the aggressor—a perception that might jeopardize support from the United States. Later it emerged that Jordan’s King Hussein, who feared all- out war, had told Meir of the coming assault.
Again, little was done. Dayan and Meir expected an attack, but not the military, political, and economic war that the Arabs had prepared. THE ATTACK ON THE SINAI OPENED with brutal force and painstaking precision. In the first minute after the 2 p. Within 2. 0 minutes, Egyptian Mi. Gs had completed as many as 3. Dinghies with assault troops sliced through the canal’s waters, the men chanting “Allahu akbar!” (“God is the greatest!”) at each stroke. Crack Cst Studio Suite 2011 Nba.
Engineers deploying water hoses, bulldozers, and explosives blasted some 6. By 5 o’clock, some 3. Within 2. 4 hours, more than 1,0. They had placed about 1,3. T- 5. 5s), 6. 5 SAM batteries, 4. By contrast, the IDF had just 1. Geographically, the boundaries of the Golan were roughly marked by Mount Hermon in the north and the Sea of Galilee in the southwest.
Syrian forces were to attack in both the north and south, preceded by an air strike. Troops in the north aimed to smash a hole in Israeli lines and then arc down to link up with the southern forces, snapping off the Golan in a pincer movement. In the south, two Syrian infantry divisions were to strike near Rafid, while an armored division broke through Israeli defenses and captured key bridges spanning the Jordan River at Benot Ya’akov and Arik, just north of the Sea of Galilee. In the north, commandos of the elite 8. Parachute Regiment initiated the attack, landing on Mount Hermon and capturing a critical Israeli observation post.
Fortunately for the Israelis, however, Syrian forces were not the equal of the Egyptians. Their officers failed to bring forward engineering units with the bridge equipment to cross Israeli antitank ditches. The Greatest Thing In The World 1898.
A massive traffic jam resulted. As the Syrians sorted things out, Israeli artillery and tank fire from the excellent 1. Barak” Armored Brigade knocked out their forward units, blunting the advance. After heavy losses, the Syrians finally crossed the ditches on October 7 and charged furiously at enemy forces positioned on the high ground. The Israelis rained fire upon the infantry in the valley below, cutting them to pieces. Similarly, Syrian armor rushed ahead with no coordination, presenting fat targets for Israeli flanking attacks and artillery fire. Three days into the fighting, the Syrians in the northern Golan threw more than 2.
Republican Guard against some 3. Israeli tanks of the elite 7th Armored Brigade, part of Brigadier General Rafael Eitan’s command. Through skillful counterattacks, this tiny Israeli force confused the Syrians, many of whom abandoned their equipment and fled.
High- explosive, armor- piercing shells rent many of the Syrian tanks that stood their ground. Red- orange flames shot skyward, and plumes of black smoke curled into the air from the smashed hulks of more than 5.
Syrian tanks and armored personnel carriers, along with 6. Israeli tanks and other equipment. The attack in the north had been stopped cold in what became known as the Valley of Tears.
In the southern Golan, the Syrians enjoyed some early success. By the end of the first day, their sheer numbers had forced a breakthrough. Though snarled traffic slowed the advance as it had in the north, the Syrians plowed forward, heading for Hushniya, northeast of the Sea of Galilee, and even attempting to take Nafekh, the Israeli command center. On the second day, Syrian commanders in the south targeted the Benot and Arik bridges—key routes for Israeli reinforcements. But problems soon mounted.
A Syrian mechanized brigade ran into a small IDF force of Super Shermans, losing 1. T- 5. 5s. A halt was called. Meanwhile, 3. 5 tanks of a Syrian armored brigade were put out of action before the Arik Bridge just as another mechanized brigade got into a firefight in the same sector. Again, this brigade stopped abruptly. In the late afternoon, 9. Syrian T- 6. 2s were advancing virtually unopposed when their commander, for reasons never determined, ordered them to stop as well.
Six- Day War - Wikipedia. This article is about the Arab–Israeli war in 1. For the Rwandan–Ugandan conflict around Kisangani, see Six- Day War (2. For the insurgency in the New Territories, Hong Kong, see Six- Day War (1.
Six- Day War. Part of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Territory held by Israel before and after the Six Day War. The Straits of Tiran are circled, between the Gulf of Aqaba to the north and the Red Sea to the south. Belligerents Israel.
Egypt Syria Jordan. Iraq. In 1. 95. 6 Israel invaded the Egyptian Sinai, with one of its objectives being the reopening of the Straits of Tiran which Egypt had blocked to Israeli shipping since 1. Israel was subsequently forced to withdraw, but won a guarantee that the Straits of Tiran would remain open. Whilst the United Nations Emergency Force was deployed along the border, there was no demilitarisation agreement. Israel reiterated its post- 1. Tiran to its shipping would be a casus belli and in late May Nasser announced the straits would be closed to Israeli vessels. Egypt then mobilised its forces along its border with Israel, and on 5 June Israel launched what it claimed were a series of preemptive airstrikes against Egyptian airfields.
Claims and counterclaims relating to this series of events are one of a number of controversies relating to the conflict. The Egyptians were caught by surprise, and nearly the entire Egyptian air force was destroyed with few Israeli losses, giving the Israelis air superiority. Simultaneously, the Israelis launched a ground offensive into the Gaza Strip and the Sinai, which again caught the Egyptians by surprise.
After some initial resistance, Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser ordered the evacuation of the Sinai. Israeli forces rushed westward in pursuit of the Egyptians, inflicted heavy losses, and conquered the Sinai. Nasser induced Syria and Jordan to begin attacks on Israel by using the initially confused situation to claim that Egypt had defeated the Israeli air strike. Israeli counterattacks resulted in the seizure of East Jerusalem as well as the West Bank from the Jordanians, while Israel's retaliation against Syria resulted in its occupation of the Golan Heights. On June 1. 1, a ceasefire was signed.
Arab casualties were far heavier than those of Israel: fewer than a thousand Israelis had been killed compared to over 2. Arab forces. Israel's military success was attributed to the element of surprise, an innovative and well- executed battle plan, and the poor quality and leadership of the Arab forces. Israel seized control of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. Israeli morale and international prestige were greatly increased by the outcome of the war and the area under Israeli control tripled.
However, the speed and ease of Israel's victory would lead to a dangerous overconfidence within the ranks of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), contributing to initial Arab successes in the subsequent 1. Yom Kippur War. The displacement of civilian populations resulting from the war would have long- term consequences, as 3. Palestinians fled the West Bank and about 1.
Syrians left the Golan to become refugees. Across the Arab world, Jewish minority communities were expelled, with refugees going to Israel or Europe. Background. After the 1.
Suez Crisis, Egypt agreed to the stationing of a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai to ensure all parties would comply with the 1. Armistice Agreements. In early November 1. Syria signed a mutual defense agreement with Egypt. President at the time, Lyndon Johnson, later had this to say about closure of these straits being a cause of the war. The right of innocent, maritime passage must be preserved for all nations.
On May 3. 0, Jordan and Egypt signed a defense pact. The following day, at Jordan's invitation, the Iraqi army began deploying troops and armoured units in Jordan. On June 1, Israel formed a National Unity Government by widening its cabinet, and on June 4 the decision was made to go to war. The next morning, Israel launched Operation Focus, a large- scale surprise air strike that was the opening of the Six- Day War. Military preparation. Before the war, Israeli pilots and ground crews had trained extensively in rapid refitting of aircraft returning from sorties, enabling a single aircraft to sortie up to four times a day (as opposed to the norm in Arab air forces of one or two sorties per day).
This enabled the Israeli Air Force (IAF) to send several attack waves against Egyptian airfields on the first day of the war, overwhelming the Egyptian Air Force, and allowed it to knock out other Arab air forces on the same day. This has contributed to the Arab belief that the IAF was helped by foreign air forces (see Controversies relating to the Six- Day War).
Pilots were extensively schooled about their targets, and were forced to memorize every single detail, and rehearsed the operation multiple times on dummy runways in total secrecy. The Egyptians had constructed fortified defenses in the Sinai.
These designs were based on the assumption that an attack would come along the few roads leading through the desert, rather than through the difficult desert terrain. The Israelis chose not to risk attacking the Egyptian defenses head- on, and instead surprised them from an unexpected direction. James Reston, writing in The New York Times on May 2. Even with 5. 0,0. Yemen, he has not been able to work his way in that small and primitive country, and even his effort to help the Congo rebels was a flop. The United States estimated Israel would need 7–1. British estimates supporting the U.
S. The first two were permanently stationed near Jerusalem and were called the Jerusalem Brigade and the mechanized Harel Brigade. Mordechai Gur's 5. Paratroopers Brigade was summoned from the Sinai front. The 1. 0th Armored Brigade was stationed north of the West Bank. The Israeli Northern Command provided a division (three brigades) led by Major- General Elad Peled, which was stationed in the Jezreel Valley to the north of the West Bank.
On the eve of the war, Egypt massed approximately 1. Sinai, including all of its seven divisions (four infantry, two armoured and one mechanized), four independent infantry brigades and four independent armoured brigades. No fewer than a third of them were veterans of Egypt's continuing intervention into the North Yemen Civil War and another third were reservists. These forces had 9.
APCs, and more than 1,0. M4. 8 Pattons. Nine brigades (4. West Bank, including the elite armoured 4.
Jordan Valley. They possessed sizable numbers of M1. APCs, a new battalion of mechanized infantry, and a paratrooper battalion trained in the new U. S.- built school. They also had 1. 2 battalions of artillery and six batteries of 8. Furthermore, Israeli post- war briefings said that the Jordanian staff acted professionally as well, but was always left .
The small Royal Jordanian Air Force consisted of only 2. British- made Hawker Hunter fighters, six transports, and two helicopters. According to the Israelis, the Hawker Hunter was essentially on par with the French- built Dassault Mirage III – the IAF's best plane.
Two squadrons of fighter- aircraft, Hawker Hunters and Mi. G 2. 1s, were rebased adjacent to the Jordanian border. PAF pilots shot down several Israeli planes. Jordan's army was equipped with American weaponry, and its air force was composed of British aircraft. Egypt had by far the largest and the most modern of all the Arab air forces, consisting of about 4. Of particular concern to the Israelis were the 3. Tu- 1. 6 . Its air force was composed principally of French aircraft, while its armoured units were mostly of British and American design and manufacture.
Some infantry weapons, including the ubiquitous Uzi, were of Israeli origin. Type. Arab armies. IDFAFVs. Egypt, Syria and Iraq used T- 3. T- 5. 4, T- 5. 5, PT- 7. SU- 1. 00/1. 52 World War II- vintage self- propelled guns.
Jordan used M- 4. M- 4. 8, and M- 4. A1 Patton tanks. Panzer IV (used by Syria).
The Centurion was upgraded with the British 1. L7 gun prior to the war.
The Sherman also underwent extensive modifications including a larger 1. French gun, redesigned turret, wider tracks, more armour, and upgraded engine and suspension. APCs/IFVs. BTR- 4.
BTR- 1. 52, BTR- 5. BTR- 6. 0 APCs. M2, / M3 Half- track, Panhard AMLArtillery. M1. 93. 7 Howitzer, BM- 2. D- 3. 0 (2. A1. 8) Howitzer, M1. M- 5. 2 1. 05 mm self- propelled howitzer (used by Jordan)M5. Makmat 1. 60 mm self- propelled mortar, Obusier de 1. Mod. Initially, both Egypt and Israel announced that they had been attacked by the other country.
On June 5 at 7: 4. Israeli time, as civil defense sirens sounded all over Israel, the IAF launched Operation Focus (Moked). All but 1. 2 of its nearly 2. Most of the Israeli warplanes headed out over the Mediterranean Sea, flying low to avoid radar detection, before turning toward Egypt.
Others flew over the Red Sea. Sidqi Mahmoud, who were en route from al Maza to Bir Tamada in the Sinai to meet the commanders of the troops stationed there. In any event, it did not make a great deal of difference as the Israeli pilots came in below Egyptian radar cover and well below the lowest point at which its SA- 2 surface- to- air missile batteries could bring down an aircraft. The runway at the Arish airfield was spared, as the Israelis expected to turn it into a military airport for their transports after the war. Surviving aircraft were taken out by later attack waves.
The operation was more successful than expected, catching the Egyptians by surprise and destroying virtually all of the Egyptian Air Force on the ground, with few Israeli losses. Only four unarmed Egyptian training flights were in the air when the strike began. In addition, Egyptian radars and SAM missiles were also attacked and destroyed.
The Israelis lost 1. Attacks on other Arab air forces by Israel took place later in the day as hostilities broke out on other fronts.